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1Introduction
There has been much debate on whether firms perform better after they are privatised, but 
so far the empirical evidence is mixed.  This is an interesting dilemma because it seems clear that 
state ownership would hamper the performance of a firm.  After all, state-owned firms are not 
solely profit-maximising.  There are often other incentives, such as keeping employment and 
wages above competitive equilibrium levels
1 .  Firms may also be state-owned to protect 
consumers, as is the case of those in industries that favour a natural monopoly, such as 
electricity.  Following this line of reasoning, one comes to the conclusion that privatising such a 
firm would allow the new (profit-maximising) owner to restructure by cutting employment or 
raising prices, for example.  The conclusion that privatisation would increase the firm 
performance seems even more straightforward in the transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU).  In these countries, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) were even more bloated in terms of employment.  Their workers received wages in cash, 
but also in the form of services, such as housing and kindergartens located on site or near to the 
firm.  The firms were not profit-maximising and were often extremely inefficient, more so than 
many firms in the West.  This inefficiency was due to the nature of the Soviet system where the 
only incentive was the threat of punishment if the planned level of output was not maintained.  
The incentive to overproduce was small because of the ‘ratchet effect’; the next year’s planned 
output level was set to the previous year’s attained output.  In addition, because of the nature of 
the shortage economy, it was guaranteed that the output would be sold.  However, once the 
Soviet system was abolished, many markets were opened to foreign competition, many firms 
were privatised and budget constraints were hardened
2 .  Section I reviews the literature on 
privatisation, both in CEE and the FSU and the rest of the world, Section II describes the data, 
1 See Shleifer (1998) for a discussion on the changing view of economists towards public and private ownership.
2 However, many firms, privatised and state-owned, received subsidies, both explicit and implicit.  An example of 
the latter form of subsidies is the toleration of tax arrears by the government.
2Section III presents empirical evidence, and Section IV concludes.
I. Literature Review
The topic of the effect of privatisation on firm performance has been extensively studied.  
This review is hardly comprehensive, especially of the vast literature on non-transition countries.  
Where possible, I have noted where further references can be obtained.  
A.  Non-Transition Literature
There is an extensive literature measuring the gains from privatisation of SOE in non-
Transition countries, much of which is inconclusive.  However, much of this literature is 
empirical.  Errunza and Mazumdar (1995) develop one of the most rigourous theoretical models.  
Their model predicts that the greatest gains from privatisation come from selling off the most 
heavily subsidised firms first.  They postulate an inverse relationship between firm size and the 
percentage gains from privatisation.  They also suggest that selling the SOE that are the smallest 
part of the government first is most beneficial.  However, this could be due to the possibilities for 
error in early privatisations, which suggests that there is a learning curve for governments 
beginning privatisations and that cross-country differences lead to different optimal methods of 
privatisation.  Further, they predict that if firms are restructured before they are privatised, the 
government will gain because of the higher revenue from the future sale.  However, this policy is 
unlikely to be optimal if the cost of the government restructuring the firm are significantly higher 
than private restructuring.  Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley (1994) give slightly different advice than 
Errunza and Mazumdar, but develop less of a theoretical framework; they mostly use examples 
from history.  They state that the primary motive of privatisation should be efficiency gains 
3rather than maximising short-term government revenue.  Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley agree with 
Errunza and Mazumdar in that small and medium sized SOE in a competitive environment 
should be privatised first because of the presence of a learning curve in privatisation.  However, 
they note that selling a large enterprise first will gain more political credibility.  They present an 
interesting alternative to privatisation: hiring management from the private sector to manage 
SOE.  Provided enough incentives for improving efficiency are included (performance based 
pay, for example), they believe that this method could be as effective as privatisation
3 .  If the 
government does privatise, it may be optimal to cut employment before selling because investors 
will be wary of buying a firm that needs large employment cuts because of the possibility of 
future labour disputes.  Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) test whether firms 
perform better after privatisation using data on 61 companies in 18 countries across 32 industries 
that were privatised between 1961 and 1990
4 .  They used data from the firms 3 years on either 
side of privatisation.  They found that privatised firms had higher profit, higher efficiency, more 
capital investment, more output, more employment (!), less debt, and a higher payout.  The most 
surprising result of their study was that firms, on the whole, increased employment after 
privatisation, which makes one question why labour unions are so opposed to privatisation.  One 
explanation is that, with privatisation (and the increased employment), wages will fall; the union 
premia will be eroded by competitive pressures and the presence of more (possibly non-union) 
workers.  
3 However, the gains from hiring private managers could be lost if the management is not given enough autonomy 
from politicians pressuring them to maintain higher employment, as is predicted by the Shleifer-Vishny (1994) 
model described below.  
4 See Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994), fn. 2 for a more complete list of contemporary empirical 
studies of the effects of privatisation on firm performance.
4B.  Transition Literature
There have been many studies that have explored the effect of privatisation on firm 
performance empirically in the transition countries (particularly the Czech Republic).  There has 
also been more work on establishing theoretical explanations of why privatised firms perform 
better than their state-owned counterparts.  There has also been a new econometric perspective 
added to the debate, which may have some relevance in all empirical studies of privatisation: the 
possible sample selection bias introduced if the government privatises the more profitable firms 
first.  
One of the earliest theoretical models establishing the benefits of privatisation in a 
transition context is Shleifer and Vishny (1994).  They formulate a model with three agents, the 
Treasury (which is assumed to play a passive role), politicians and managers.  Politicians 
pressure managers to employ more than the efficient number of employees to increase his 
political support.  The managers, who are assumed to represent the interest of shareholders, 
prefer to have no excess employment and require subsidies from the government in order to 
comply with the politician’s request.  They set up a bargaining model which predicts that in the 
presence of full corruption, the allocation of control and cash rights to a firm will not matter 
because the politician will be satisfied with lower employment if he receives enough bribes (the 
Irrelevance Proposition).  However, when bribes are not allowed, privatisation is associated with 
a transfer of cash flow and control rights from the politician to the manager, who will then 
choose to employ no excess labour and maximising profits.  Furthermore, potentially profitable 
firms, upon privatisation, are less likely to hold excess employment than unviable firms because 
they have less of a need to retain government subsidies, which are conditional on excess 
employment.  This model predicts that in the absence of full corruption, privatised and 
5corporatised firms will outperform SOEs.  Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) extend this 
model to show that firm restructuring is more likely when privatisation is accompanied by 
stabilisation policies.  Blanchard and Aghion (1996) focus on the problems associated with 
insider privatisation.  They show that in the presence of higher unemployment and collusion 
among the inside owners delays restructuring.  Insiders oppose outsider ownership because of the 
layoffs that are necessary (and inevitable with outside ownership).  They posit that restructuring 
is less likely under insider managerial control than worker control because collusion is easier 
among the smaller group of managers.  These problems can be slightly alleviated if shares can be 
sold anonymously, which reduces the power of enforcement of the collusive agreement.  In 
contrast to Blanchard and Aghion, Roland and Sekkat (2000) demonstrate that career concerns of 
managers can speed up the process of restructuring by insider managerial owners.  In a different 
line of theoretical papers, Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2000) present theoretical arguments as to 
why there will be sample selection bias: better performing firms will be privatised first.  Using 
data on 1121 privatised Czech firms, they show that firm performance is linked to early 
privatisation
5 .  Thus, any study of privatisation and firm performance in the Transition countries 
should take this bias into consideration.  
There have been many empirical studies of the benefits of privatisation on firm 
performance with mixed results
6 .  Using data on mostly medium and large firms in seven CEE 
countries, controlling for the possible endogeneity bias, Claessens and Djankov (1997) find that 
privatised firms show increased performance (as measured by TFP with energy consumption 
used as a proxy for capital).  Claessens, Djankov and Pohl (1997) find that concentration of 
ownership, even when the majority owner is an investment fund with loans to the firm, is 
associated with firm performance.  Frydman et al (1999) use data on medium and large firms in 
5 Marcincin and van Wijnbergen (1997) also find evidence that better firms were privatised earlier.
6 Other papers include Konings (1997), Nitikin and Weiss (2001), Earle (1998),  Walsh and Whelan (2001) and Lizal 
and Svejnar (1997).
6Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary from 1990-1993 to test whether ownership affects firm 
performance.  They find that privatisation has a positive impact on firm performance.  For a 
review of the evidence from other papers, see Estrin (2000), Nellis (1999) or Beven, Estrin and 
Schaffer (1999).  
II. The Data
The data are from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey  
(BEEPS), the transition economies component of the World Business Environment Survey, 
which was jointly conducted by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD).  There are 4104 firms in the sample from 25 transition countries as well 
as Turkey.   The questions asked in the survey encompass the basic questions of firm 
classification, but the main focus of the survey is the relationship of the firm to the government 
and corporate governance.  For a detailed overview of the survey and the responses, see Hellman 
et al. (2000).  The survey tries to be fully representative across industry (manufacturing and 
services), number of employees, location (in large and small cities as well as rural areas), 
ownership (domestic and foreign, private and state-owned), and include a number of firms that 
export
7 .
7 See Table 1a and 1b for some basic summary statistics.
7III. Empirical Results
This paper focuses on demonstrating the negative effects if insider ownership as 
predicted by Aghion and Blanchard (1996).  The nature of the data allow for a test of the 
hypothesis of Roland and Sekkat (2000) that manager owned firms perform better than SOE.  
However, it is impossible to test the motives for restructuring.  Roland and Sekkat predict that 
managerial career concerns will hasten restructuring.  However, managers could also restructure 
upon realising it is the best way to be able to increase wages or employment even if they have no 
plans to sell the firm to an outside owner.  It could also be a purely self-enhancing decision; 
restructuring improves performance and allows greater rents to be extracted.  I also test whether 
foreign, outside domestic, individual and collective farmer ownership increases performance.  
The regressions in Table 4 are binomial logit regressions using ownership (private versus 
state) as the dependent variable and performance (as measured by the growth in employment and 
sales over the past three years with the 10% extreme values on either end filtered out) along with 
control variables for industry, country, location, size (where appropriate) and age
8 .  The industry 
variables use farming/forestry/fishing, mining/quarrying, manufacturing, energy, 
communications and services.  The country controls are dummies for country in which the firm 
operates (with Turkey excluded).  The location controls are dummies for whether the firm is in a 
large city, small city/town or rural area, where the latter is left out.  This regression is a test of 
which direction causality runs between ownership and performance.  If the coefficients on the 
performance variables are significant, that would indicate that better performing firms might be 
privatised more rapidly than those performing poorly.  In all the regressions I ran, excluding the 
regression for small enterprises using sales growth as the measure of performance, firm 
8 The description of the variables used are presented in Table 1c.
8performance was strongly significant.  This gives support for the result found by Gupta, Ham 
and Svejnar (2000) that there is an endogeneity bias built into the data.  Using employment 
change as the measure of performance, the coefficient was significant at the 1 percent level.  In 
large firms using sales growth as a measure of performance, the result was similar, positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level.  In these three cases, an increase in performance of one percent 
was associated with between 0.9 and 2.6% increase in the probability of being privatised.  
However, for small enterprises when using sales growth as the measure of performance, the 
coefficient was negative and insignificant (-0.7%).  This suggests that in all the other regressions 
excluding the last case, the results should be taken cautiously because it might be the case that 
better firms are more likely to be privatised or privately owned.  
Bearing these results in mind, next I ran several regressions using different measures of 
performance, ownership aggregation and size of firm.  Table 2 uses employment change (with 
the extreme values filtered out) as the dependent variable.  The first three columns are 
regressions using only large and medium firms, so a size dummy is needed.  The dummy is equal 
to one if the firm is large (defined as having employment over 200) and zero if the firm is 
medium sized (with employment between 100 and 199).  In these regressions, private and 
privatised firms outperform those that remain state-owned.  Foreign and individually owned 
firms do significantly better than state-owned firms while those owned by insiders or collective 
farmers perform significantly worse than state-owned firms.  Newer firms have significantly 
better performance than older, while bigger firms do insignificantly worse than smaller firms.  
These variables could be proxying for whether a firm is de novo or whether it is traditional.  As 
the Durbin-Watson statistic shows, there does not appear to be a problem with residual 
autocorrelation, which makes sense because these data were all collected at once.  The 
regressions in the second three columns for small enterprises show similar results as for large 
9enterprises.  
Moving on to the regressions in Table 3, the results are not nearly so clear and 
predictable  for small firms.  For medium and large firms, most of the conclusions drawn in the 
preceding paragraph still hold, although the coefficient on insider owned firms has become 
insignificant (but still negative) and the coefficient on manager owned firms is positively 
significant.  In addition, the age variable has lost significance in all the regressions using medium 
and large enterprises and is negative for the regression with the most disaggregated ownership 
variables
9 .
The regression results are more inconclusive using sales growth as the dependent variable 
and only small firms.  The results from Table 4 suggested these results would be the most 
conclusive about the true causal relationship from ownership to performance because sales 
change with 10 percent extreme values removed is insignificant.  In all three regressions, of the 
ownership variables, only insider and worker owned firms have significant coefficients (both 
negative).  Furthermore, the age of the firm has regained its positive significance at the 5 or 10 
percent level.  This final set of regressions might indicate that there isn’t much in the way of 
gains from privatisation; the results that show a gain are marred by endogeneity bias.  
These results are quite robust.  In addition to the 12 regression specifications presented 
here, I also used the same specifications with both empch and salesch unfiltered, as well as 
filtering out only the 5 percent extreme values.  The results were similar, but had less 
significance due, most likely, to outliers (values of the unfiltered variables ranged from -90 to 
900 percent growth in the past three years).  The results are also robust to the inclusion of a 
variable indicating whether it is the norm for firms in the industries questioned to use bribes to 
‘get things done’.  That variable turned out to be insignificant in all specifications, which casts 
9 The negative coefficient would suggest that older firms outperform younger ones; a strange result for which I have 
no explanation.
10some doubt on the Shleifer-Vishny Irrelevance Proposition.  
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to present empirical evidence for the relationship between 
ownership and performance.  However, there appears to be evidence of endogeneity bias that 
gives false hope for the gains from privatisation.  However, not having a suitable instrumental 
variable to control for this bias, except sales growth in the regressions using only small 
enterprises, I cannot conclusively assert whether the results from the other regressions are robust 
to controlling for endogeneity bias.  
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Table 1a: Country-Specific Summary Statistics
Country Number Percentage % SOE % Private
Albania 163 4.0 20.9 79.1
Armenia 125 3.0 20.0 80.0
Azerbaijan 137 3.3 18.2 81.8
Belarus 132 3.2 18.9 81.1
Bosnia 127 3.1 20.5 79.5
Bulgaria 130 3.2 19.2 80.8
Croatia 127 3.1 21.3 78.7
Czech Republic 149 3.6 16.8 83.2
Estonia 132 3.2 18.9 81.1
Georgia 129 3.1 19.4 80.6
Hungary 147 3.6 17.0 83.0
Kazakhstan 147 3.6 18.4 81.6
Kyrgyzstan 132 3.2 18.9 81.1
Latvia 166 4.0 19.9 80.1
Lithuania 112 2.7 0.0 100.0
Macedonia 136 3.3 18.4 81.6
Moldova 139 3.4 18.0 82.0
Poland 246 6.0 10.2 89.8
Serbia (FYR) 65 1.6 46.2 53.8
Romania 125 3.0 20.0 80.0
Russia 552 13.5 4.5 95.5
Slovakia 138 3.4 18.1 81.9
Slovenia 125 3.0 20.0 80.0
Turkey 150 3.7 16.7 83.3
Ukraine 247 6.0 10.1 89.9
Uzbekistan 126 3.1 19.8 80.2
Total 4104 100.0 15.9 84.1
CEE (1) 1678 40.9 20.7 79.3
FSU (2) 1866 45.5 16.6 83.4
Baltics (3) 410 10.0 12.9 87.1
Source: BEEPS and author's calculations Source: BEEPS and author's calculations Source: BEEPS and author's calculations
(1) CEE is defined as Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,  (1) CEE is defined as Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,  (1) CEE is defined as Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,  (1) CEE is defined as Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,  (1) CEE is defined as Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
(2) FSU is defined as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  (2) FSU is defined as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  (2) FSU is defined as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  (2) FSU is defined as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  (2) FSU is defined as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
(3) Baltics is defined as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (3) Baltics is defined as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (3) Baltics is defined as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































location Dummies for city size in which firm is located
country Dummies for country in which firm is located
industry Dummies for industry in which firm operates
empch10 Employment change in the last 3 years with 10% extreme values removed
salesch10 Sales change in the last 3 years with 10% extreme values removed
size Dummy for whether firm is large, used only in med. and lg. firm regressions
age Date in which firm was founded (1806-1999)
Ownership Dummy Variables  
privown Private Ownership (All)
forown Foreign Ownership
indivown Individual Ownership
outdomown Outside, Domestic Ownership
domown Domestic Company Ownership
invown Investment Fund Ownership




15Table 2: Regressions on Employment Growth
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Private 6.287*** 12.117***
 (3.175)   (4.184) 
Foreign 10.154*** 14.371*** 8.565** 18.295***
 (2.660)   (4.019)   (2.095)   (4.081) 
Individually 15.426*** 13.176***
 (7.082)   (5.124) 
Outside (Domestic) 3.866 6.074**
 (1.576)   (2.062) 
Domestic Company 3.435 11.615***
 (1.160)   (2.680) 
Investment Fund -3.379 -4.734
 (0.643)   (0.383) 
Collective Farmers -14.346** Dropped
 (2.323) 
Insider -5.645** -10.709***
 (2.516)   (3.819) 
Manager 1.27 3.859
 (0.259)   (0.691) 
Worker -0.03175 -0.0816
 (0.013)   (0.021) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size -1.732 -2.541 -1.24
 (1.009)   (1.447)   (.743) 
Age (†) 0.04465 0.06767** 0.01981 0.07901 0.171*** 0.06969
 (1.352)   (1.965)   (0.629)   (1.199)   (2.818)   (1.094) 
R-squared 0.083 0.089 0.159 0.111 0.119 0.136
Adj. R-squared 0.041 0.043 0.114 0.08 0.086 0.102
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.992 1.994 2.014 2.018 1.997 2.033
The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic
is outside the range [1.7, 2.3]. is outside the range [1.7, 2.3]. is outside the range [1.7, 2.3].
(†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999.
(1) - (3) Uses employment change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and  (1) - (3) Uses employment change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and  (1) - (3) Uses employment change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and  (1) - (3) Uses employment change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and  (1) - (3) Uses employment change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and  (1) - (3) Uses employment change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and  (1) - (3) Uses employment change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and 
large enterprises so size is a dummy of whether the firm is large. large enterprises so size is a dummy of whether the firm is large. large enterprises so size is a dummy of whether the firm is large. large enterprises so size is a dummy of whether the firm is large. large enterprises so size is a dummy of whether the firm is large.
(4) - (6) Uses employment change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses employment change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses employment change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses employment change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses employment change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses employment change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses employment change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so 
there is no size dummy. there is no size dummy.
Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic.
Note: ***, **, * = Sig. at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Note: ***, **, * = Sig. at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Note: ***, **, * = Sig. at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Note: ***, **, * = Sig. at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
16Table 3: Regressions on Sales Growth
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Private 8.124** -7.149
 (2.158)   (1.232) 
Foreign 15.144** 23.888*** 0.102 -0.802
 (2.315)  (3.795)   (0.015)   (0.106) 
Individually 16.059*** -3.886
 (3.892)   (0.831) 
Outside (Domestic) -1.237 -4.712
 (0.272)   (0.866) 
Domestic Company 7.265 12.309
 (1.140)   (1.502) 
Investment Fund -5.474 -26.261
 (0.478)   (1.251) 
Collective Farmers -21.185** Dropped
 (1.969) 
Insider -5.142 -8.968**
 (1.160)   (2.034) 
Manager 22.532** -6.536
 (2.325)   (0.804)
Worker -2.98 -13.702**
 (0.582)   (2.046) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size 1.446 0.884 1.532
 (0.452)   (0.272)   (0.489) 
Age (†) 0.01805 0.07069 -0.02226 0.245** 0.193* 0.229*
 (0.292)   (1.141)   (0.374)   (2.013)   (1.664)   (1.940) 
R-squared 0.138 0.145 0.198 0.133 0.135 0.143
Adj. R-squared 0.074 0.075 0.127 0.098 0.097 0.104
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.05 2.067 2.114 1.944 1.938 1.962
The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic The D-W statistic tests for the presence of residual autocorrelation.  A problem only occurs if the statistic
is outside the range [1.7, 2.3]. is outside the range [1.7, 2.3]. is outside the range [1.7, 2.3].
(†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999. (†) Age is measured by the year in which the firm was founded.  It ranges from 1806-1999.
(1) - (3) Uses sales change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and large enterprises (1) - (3) Uses sales change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and large enterprises (1) - (3) Uses sales change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and large enterprises (1) - (3) Uses sales change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and large enterprises (1) - (3) Uses sales change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and large enterprises (1) - (3) Uses sales change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and large enterprises (1) - (3) Uses sales change (without the 10% extreme values) and filters out only the medium and large enterprises
so size is a dummy of whether the firm is large. so size is a dummy of whether the firm is large. so size is a dummy of whether the firm is large. so size is a dummy of whether the firm is large.
(4) - (6) Uses sales change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses sales change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses sales change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses sales change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses sales change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses sales change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so  (4) - (6) Uses sales change (minus the 10% extreme values) and includes only small enterprises so 
there is no size dummy. there is no size dummy. there is no size dummy.
Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic. Note: The number in brackets under the coefficients is the absolute value of the t-statistic.
17Table 4: Binomial
 Logit Regressions on Ownership (Private vs. State)
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
PerfCh (a) 0.013*** 0.009** 0.026*** -0.007
 (0.002)  (0.022)   (0.000)   (0.198) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size -0.147 -0.011*
 (0.460)   (0.0964) 
Age 0.028*** 0.032** 0.086* 0.102***
 (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Prediction Accuracy 78.5% 80.6% 92.7% 96.1%
R-squared (b) 0.23 0.277 0.199 0.139
R-squared (c) 0.329 0.392 0.411 0.394
(1) - (4) use sector (1 = private, 0 = state) as dependent variable (1) - (4) use sector (1 = private, 0 = state) as dependent variable (1) - (4) use sector (1 = private, 0 = state) as dependent variable (1) - (4) use sector (1 = private, 0 = state) as dependent variable
(1) - (2) use only medium and large enterprises, while (3) - (4) (1) - (2) use only medium and large enterprises, while (3) - (4) (1) - (2) use only medium and large enterprises, while (3) - (4) (1) - (2) use only medium and large enterprises, while (3) - (4)
          use only small enterprises so the variable size is excluded.           use only small enterprises so the variable size is excluded.           use only small enterprises so the variable size is excluded.           use only small enterprises so the variable size is excluded.
(a) Performance is measured by employment growth in the last 3 years in (1) and (3) and sales growth in the last 3 years in (1) and (3) and sales growth in the last 3 years in (1) and (3) and sales growth in the
last 3 years for (2) and (4) excluding the 10% last 3 years for (2) and (4) excluding the 10% last 3 years for (2) and (4) excluding the 10%
 extreme values on both ends.  extreme values on both ends.
(b) Cox & Snell R-square (b) Cox & Snell R-square
(c) Nagelkerke R-square (c) Nagelkerke R-square
Note: The values in brackets under the coefficient estimates Note: The values in brackets under the coefficient estimates Note: The values in brackets under the coefficient estimates Note: The values in brackets under the coefficient estimates
are p-values.
Source: Author's calculations from the BEEPS dataset Source: Author's calculations from the BEEPS dataset Source: Author's calculations from the BEEPS dataset
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